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- Gomes v. Ukiah Unified Scghool Dist.
Appellants Steven L. Gomes and Premier Design & Construction, Inc. (Gomes), real estate developers, challenged a school facilities fee imposed by respondent Ukiah Unified School District (District). In a prior appeal, court reversed because the District had failed to identify the use to which the fee would be put, as required by law. (Gomes v. Ukiah Unified School Dist. (Nov. 10, 2004, A104744) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 10 to 13, 15 (Gomes II).) The District's fee resolution did, however, recite that the fees would be used for "construction and/or reconstruction of school facilities as identified in the plan," and made reference to "applications and related documents filed with the State Allocation Board . . . (. . . referred to as the 'Plan.')" Because "the Plan" was not in the record we could not determine what it was, or whether the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of the facilities for which it was imposed. We therefore remanded for the limited purpose of giving the District the opportunity to produce the plan referred to in the resolution; court directed the trial court to determine whether there was a "Plan," and whether the fees exceeded the reasonable costs of the "Plan." (Id. at pp. 13-14, 15.)
The trial court should not have permitted the introduction of testimony and a new set of documents to prove a newly minted theory to justify the Districtâs fee. This kind of post hoc rationalization fails to conform to the procedures required by law. Moreover, although the District is entitled to rely on public documents to identify the facilities for which the fee will be used, the "applications and related documents filed with the State Allocation Board" (relied upon by the District in adopting the fee) do not comprise any decipherable "Plan" for any facilities. Accordingly, court reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with orders to issue the peremptory writ of mandate.
Mon, 12 Mar 2007 21:07:59 EST
- PEOPLE v. POKOVICH PART - III
Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 10:08:32 EST
- PEOPLE v. POKOVICH PART - II
Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 10:07:35 EST
- PEOPLE v. POKOVICH PART - I
Impeachment of testifying defendant at trial with statements made before trial to mental health professionals during a court-ordered examination to determine the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, violates federal constitution's privilege against self incrimination. Where the evidence against defendant was overwhelming the bullet fragment taken from one of the victims' cars matched not only the shell casings found at defendant's home, but also defendant's rifle, and defendant was seen holding his rifle at time of the car shootings and extent of impeachment at trial with statements defendant made at mental health evaluation was minimal, error did not contribute to verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, and did not prejudice defendant.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:38:50 EST
- WELLS v. ONE2ONE LEARNING FOUNDATION PART - IV
Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:33:09 EST
- WELLS v. ONE2ONE LEARNING FOUNDATION PART - III
Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:29:54 EST
- WELLS v. ONE2ONE LEARNING FOUNDATION PART - II
Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:28:10 EST
- WELLS v. ONE2ONE LEARNING FOUNDATION PART - I
Public school districts are not "persons" who may be sued under California False Claims Act. Charter schools, and individuals, corporations, entities, or organizations that operate them, are "persons" subject to suit under both CFCA and unfair competition law, and are not exempt from either law merely because such schools are deemed part of the public school system. A CFCA cause of action is not a barred claim for educational malfeasance insofar as it asserts, not simply that defendant's charter schools provided a substandard education, but that they submitted false claims for school funds while failing to furnish any significant educational services, materials, and supplies. A CFCA cause of action is not barred insofar as it alleges that, before 2000, that charter schools violated independent study rules set forth in a 1993 statute, Education Code Sec. 51747.3, because Sec. 51747.3 applied to charter schools even before its amendment in 1999. A qui tam action under CFCA against a charter school operator is not subject to Tort Claims Act requirement of prior presentment of a claim for payment.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:27:13 EST
- SIGNATURE FRUIT COMPANY v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Temporary disability during a seasonal employee's in season period of regular employment is payable based on two thirds of the employee's in season average weekly earnings, subject to the minimum and maximum levels established under Labor Code Sec. 4453. Where employee does not have any off season earnings and does not compete in open labor market during a portion of the year, employee is not entitled to temporary disability payments during that season.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:26:10 EST
- PEOPLE v. JOHNSON
At murder defendant's second trial, conducted due to court's misinstruction of jury on reasonable doubt at first trial, prosecutor's withholding of police reports about a police investigation into a shooting outside a convenience store after first trial but before second trial violated due process, where reports contained evidence indicating that a key prosecution witness, whom prosecutor described as having no pre existing biases or reasons to lie about defendant, had connections to gang members and thus had motivation to give false testimony.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:25:26 EST
- FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: M.B.S. Part I
This case is before the Court on M.B.S.'s motion for rehearing of this Court's order denying him admission to The Florida Bar. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, court reaffirm previous decision to deny M.B.S. admission to The Florida Bar.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:24:40 EST
- FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS RE: M.B.S. Part II
This case is before the Court on M.B.S.'s motion for rehearing of this Court's order denying him admission to The Florida Bar. Court have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, court reaffirm previous decision to deny M.B.S. admission to The Florida Bar.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:24:25 EST
- PARKER vs. PARKER
Court have review Parker v. Parker, 916 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in M.A.F. v. G.L.K., 573 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).1 The conflict issue is whether a wife's misrepresentation of paternity in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. This differentiation is significant because of the one year limitation for filing a motion for relief from judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). As explained below, we agree with the Fourth District that this type of misconduct is intrinsic fraud and, therefore, relief from any judgment based upon such fraud must be sought within one year. Consequently, court approve the Fourth District's decision in Parker finding that the petitioner's motion is time barred, and court disapprove the First District's conflicting decision in M.A.F. Consistent with our resolution of this issue, court also reject the petitioner's alternative request that court reinstate his independent action against his former wife for damages based on this fraud.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:24:09 EST
- BARNETT vs. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES
Court accepted jurisdiction to review Barnett v. Department of Management Services, 931 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified a question of great public importance. After further consideration, court conclude that court should exercise our discretion and decline review because the circumstances of this case are fact specific. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:19:01 EST
- IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA PROBATE RULES Part I
This matter is before the Court for consideration of proposed amendments to the Florida Probate Rules.On October 30, 2006, the Florida Probate Rules Committee (Committee) filed a fast track report recommending various amendments to the Florida Probate Rules in response to 2006 legislation. The Committee has proposed amendments to a number of rules, mostly in response to statutory changes made by chapters 2006 77 and 2006 178, Laws of Florida. Chapter 2006 77 became effective June 6, 2006, and chapter 206 178 became effective July 1, 2006. In addition, the Committee has recommended amendments to several rules in order to reflect the recent renumbering of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. See In re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin., 939 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 2006). All proposed amendments were approved by unanimous vote of the Committee and the Executive Committee of The Florida Bar Board of Governors. The Committee published the proposals in the November 1, 2006, edition of The Florida Bar News, with a request that comments be filed directly with the Court. No comments have been filed. Accordingly, upon consideration of the Committee's report and the relevant legislation, we hereby amend the Florida Probate Rules as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The amendments shall become effective immediately.
It is so ordered.
Wed, 7 Mar 2007 08:18:48 EST